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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs
CASE NO. 950515-CA
Priority No. 2

RUSSELL RAY THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
in this case pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996), as this
case was poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to a letter dated June 12, 1995 from Geoffrey J.
Butler, Clerk of the Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by

improperly limiting testimony regarding the victim's
aggressive and violent character.
Standard of Review.
A trial court's determination with regard to the
admissibility of evidence is a conclusion of law that is

1

reviewed for correctness, and will not be reversed unless
"clearly erroneous" State v. Diaz, 859 P. 2d 19, (Utah App.
1993).

However, the trial court's conclusions of law are

accorded no deference by the reviewing court.

State v.

Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v.

Wilcox, 808

P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
781-82 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the evidence presented at trial fails to

sustain a conviction of first degree murder in as much as
the state failed to prove every element of the offense and
failed to refute the self defense claim beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Standard of Review.
In making a determination as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate
court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient
competent evidence as to each element of the charge to
enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant committed the crime.

State v. Warden, 813 P.2d

1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).
While it is the "exclusive function of the jury to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the
2

evidence,"

State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah

1986), a verdict may be overturned when the "evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not
have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v.
Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555 (Utah 1985)).

The reviewing court

must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict.

State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah

1987) .
3.

Whether the cumulative errors occurring in this

trial require a reversal of Mr. Thompson's conviction.
Standard of Review.
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which,
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal,
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings."

State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949,

957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verder 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), aff'd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).

For

an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
3

1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND COURT RULES

The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah
Constitutions are presented for interpretation, and they
provide:
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part,
Section 1. . . . [no State shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law . . .
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
[Due Process of Law] No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
The relevant statutes involved in this case include Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203, 76-2-401 and 76-2-402, which provide,
in pertinent part:
76-5-203. Murder.
(1)

Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another commits an act clearly dangerous to human
life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life engages in
4

conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another;

76-2-401. Justification as defense - When allowed.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution
for any offense based on the conduct. The defense of
justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of
persons or property under the
circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402
through 76-2-406 of this part;
76-2-402. Force in defense of person - Forcible felony
defined.
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent that he or
she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person
is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she
reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person as a result of the other's imminent use of
unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under
Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is
not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would
result in death or serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent
propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the
parties' relationship.

Rules 404(a)and 404(a) (2)of the Utah Rules of Evidence are

5

also presented for interpretation by this Court.

Such

subsections of Rule 404 provide the following:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor . . .

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This case comes to the Utah

Court of Appeals from a conviction of Mr. Russell Ray
Thompson of a first degree felony murder pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-203.

Defendant/Appellant was tried before a

jury, the Honorable Leslie Lewis presiding.

The case

involved a confrontation between the defendant/appellant and
the decedent at the defendant/appellant's home. After an
argument, the deceased was shot and killed.

At trial,

defendant/appellant argued his acts were justified and
necessary to defend himself from death or serious bodily
injury.

B.

Course of the Proceedings,

Mr. Thompson was charged

with first degree felony murder for the death of Trika
Ballard on April 23, 1994, under U.C.A. §76-5-203. A
three-day jury trial was held January 9 - 11, 1995. At
trial, the defendant/appellant sought to introduce evidence
regarding specific acts of violence by the decedent.

Judge

Lewis ruled the proposed testimony inadmissible and severely
limited the evidence that could be introduced.

7

On January

11, 1995, Mr. Thompson, the defendant/appellant, was found
guilty as charged.
On May 12, 1995, Thompson was sentenced to five years to
life and fined $9,250.00. His notice of appeal was timely
filed, and on August 16, 1995, this case was poured over
from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals.
On December 17, 1996, this Court granted Mr. Thompson's
motion to withdraw his prior brief and the filing of this
new brief was permitted.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 23, 1994, Russell Ray Thompson and his
girlfriend, Lisa Edwards, were in the company of Trika
Ballard.

The three friends had been drinking heavily and

each had received two injections of methamphetamine that
day.

(R. 942-55).

In the evening, all three went to

Thompson's apartment, where Ballard attempted to initiate a
sexual encounter with Edwards in the bedroom. (R. 954-55).
While Ballard and Edwards were in the bedroom, an
acquaintance of Thompson's, Chad Murray, arrived at the
apartment to pick up some marijuana.

(R. 955-57) . Murray

purchased a bag of marijuana from Thompson and left.
8

(R.

957) .
Thompson returned to the bedroom and tried to stop
Ballard from continuing the sexual encounter.

(R. 957) . He

told Ballard he knew she was unable to donate plasma at the
blood center because she had AIDS.

(R. 958).

became incensed at the suggestion,

and lashed out at

Edwards and pinned her against the closet door.

Ballard

Thompson

tried to separate the two women, and tried to get Ballard
calmed down. (Id.)
Ballard did not calm down.
increasingly erratic.

In fact, her behavior grew

(R. 959-60).

After the initial

confrontation, Ballard went into the living room and phoned
her sister, Trina Russom.

Thompson got on the phone to ask

Russom to come and get her sister because was out of
control.

(R. 960) . During this period, Ballard tore up the

residence, broke things, uprooted plants and overturned
furniture.

She continued to grow more agitated and

aggressive. (R. 960-64).

Trina Russom was not willing to

come and help Thompson and Edwards with her sister, Trika.
(Id.)
During the chaos, Thompson noticed his .44 magnum pistol
was missing from its usual place on bedroom night stand.
9

(R. 961). He asked Ballard if she had taken the gun.

They

argued for a short time, and then she told him she would
kill him with his own gun, and made a threatening gesture.
(R. 961). Thompson began searching for the .44 but was not
able to find it.
the weapon.

He believed Ballard had taken and hidden

(Id.).

While searching for the missing .44, Thompson phoned
Ballard's sister a third time pleading for help with the
increasingly frantic situation.

He offered to pay for her

cab, round trip, if she would just come and get her sister
under control.

(R. 964). Russom explained to Thompson that

sometimes Ballard had to be knocked unconscious to get her
under control.

She told Thompson he should "knock her out."

(R. 965-66).
On Russom's advise, Thompson hit Ballard on the left
side of the face with the .22 rifle, but it didn't phase
her.

(R. 966)

With Ballard undaunted, Thompson phoned

Russom again pleaded with her to help them with her sister.
(Id.).
During this call, a shot rang out from the bedroom where
Ballard and Edwards were.

Thompson leapt to the other room

and saw Edwards holding the .22 rifle.
10

(R. 968). Edwards

tossed the rifle on the bed and she and Ballard went into
the living room.

(R.

970). Thompson, still in the

bedroom, heard Edwards say, "She's got the gun." (Id-).
Thompson grabbed the rifle and rushed out to see what was
happening. (R. 971) .
Thompson saw Ballard behind the recliner chair in the
living room with the .44 magnum.
Thompson.

Ballard aimed the gun at

Believing that he was about to be shot and

killed, Thompson fired his rifle at Ballard in self defense
and shot her six times, killing her.

(R. 973-74)

Realizing their friend was dead, Thompson and Edwards
panicked.

They put the body in a blanket and loaded it into

his truck.
Park.

The body was then taken and left near Pioneer

(R. 980-81).

With the assistance of some friends,

Thompson and Edwards left the state and traveled to Spokane,
Washington, where Thompson was arrested three days later.
(R. 986-94).
At trial, the defense sought to introduce evidence
regarding the victim's propensity for violence to establish
that the victim had a character trait for violence.
8 62).

(R.

The defense produced witness Robert Russom, the

decedent's brother-in-law, to testify to the victim's
11

character trait for physical domestic violence, including
fighting.

(R. 8 63).

In addition, the defense produced Ivan

Kelly Brimhall, a friend of the decedent's, to testify to
the victim's character trait for violence and threatening
violence.

(R. 864). The trial court ruled that the

testimony of Mr. Russom and Mr. Brimhall was inadmissable as
it was highly prejudicial.

The trial court further denied

the defense from asking anything more than "Have you ever
known her [Ballard] to be violent and use a weapon?"

(R.

868) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court judge erred by improperly ruling that
evidence of the victim's propensity for violence was
inadmissible.

Rule 402(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

allows the defendant to bring into evidence a pertinent
character trait. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(5) permits the
trier of fact to consider the prior violent acts or violent
propensities of an aggressor. The trier of fact was
wrongfully prohibited from considering evidence of the
decedent's violent character and propensity for violence.

12

Further, the prosecution's evidence at trial was
insufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder.
The state failed to prove the element of intent in this case
and was further unable to refute the claim of self defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sum of these errors prejudiced the defendant to the
jury

to such an extent that the defendant's conviction

should be overturned.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED EVIDENCE OF THE
VICTIM'S VIOLENT CHARACTER.
Evidence of the victim's violent character is relevant

to prove that the deceased may have been the aggressor.
While character evidence is not ordinarily admissible to
show the person acted in accordance with that character
trait on a particular occasion, Rule 404 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, (1992 as amended), an exception to this
general rule requires the trial court to admit character
evidence of the victim when offered to demonstrate the
accused acted in self defense.
Rules of Evidence.

Rule 404(a)(2) of the Utah

This well-settled exception allows an
13

accused in a homicide case who defends on the grounds of
self-defense to offer evidence of a victim's violent or
overly aggressive character., The principal manner in which
character evidence may be introduced is evidence of a
specific acts of violence criminal conviction or reputation
evidence of a victim's character.

State v. Minnish, 560

P.2d 340 (Utah 1977); State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah
1982) .
At trial, but out of the presence of the jury, a proffer
of proof was made that the deceased had committed several
acts of domestic violence in the past.

(R. 856). Because

Thompson's claim of self defense placed the issue of the
deceased's character into evidence, he was entitled to prove
the overly aggressive and violent character of the deceased,
but the trial court did not allow such testimony.
The trial court ruled that this evidence would not be
admitted because of its "highly prejudicial" nature and
concluded the defense would only be permitted to ask very
limited and carefully phrased questions, specifically
excluding critical testimony of prior violent behavior. (R.
864-69).

(See Addendum A for the court's discussion on this

issue,)
14

Evidence of the deceased's violent and aggressive
character nonetheless was relevant in this case to prove
that the victim may have been the aggressor and that
Thompson was fearful of the deceased and justified in that
belief.

Whigmore addressed this concern in his treatise on

evidence stating:
When the issue of self defense is made in a trial
for homicide and thus a controversy arises whether
the deceased was the aggressor, one's persuasion
will be more or less affected by the character of
the deceased; it may throw much light on the
probabilities of the deceased's action.
1 V. Whigmore, Evidence, § 63 (3rd ed. 1940).

In the

instant case, the defense, consistent with Whigmore, wished
to elicit testimony regarding the aggressive and violent
character of the deceased though the testimony of Mr. Robert
Russom and Mr. Ivan Brimhall.

Such testimony would have

allowed the jury to acknowledge that Thompson acted
reasonably in his use of deadly force in self defense.
Through the testimony of Mr. Robert Russom, the defense
attempted to show that the decedent had been violent during
the fifteen year period preceding her death.

Mr. Russom

testified that the decedent had fought with her sister,
Trina Russom, (R. 857), and had also fought with her

15

husband.

(R. 863 and 870) .

Another witness, Mr. Ivan Brimhall, also was prepared to
testify he had seen the decedent physically attack her
sister.

(R. 859 and 878).

He described how he saw the

decedent violently attack her sister and threaten to kill
her. (Id.).
When the jury returned, the trial court limited
counsel's questioning of the decedent's character for
violence to the following two questions:
1.
2.

Have you ever seen her behave in an aggressive or
violent manner?
Have you ever known her to be violent and use a
weapon? (R. 866).

In order to properly establish the decedent's

character

and reputation for danger, violence and aggressiveness, the
defense should have been able to ask the witnesses more
specific questions, such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Have you ever observed the deceased exhibit
violence that endangered others?
Have you ever observed the deceased behave overly
aggressive and exhibit deadly violence?
Have those occasions you have observed the
deceased exhibit violence in a domestic setting?
Have you ever observed the deceased exhibit
violence while she was under the influence of drugs
or alcohol?

This line of questioning would have produced testimony
16

showing the deceased had a known history and reputation for
violence and the jury could therefore infer that the use of
deadly force in self defense was justified.

This crucial

testimony would have given support to the defendant's
testimony at trial that, in the midst of a crisis, deadly
force was necessary to save his life and even possibly the
life of Thompson's girlfriend, Ms. Edwards.

Instead, the

trial court merely allowed a general question of whether Mr.
Russom or Mr. Brimhall had ever seen the victim behave in an
aggressive or violent manner.
Decisions based on similar rules of evidence support the
defense's contention before the trial court that the
proposed line of questioning was proper.
In People v. Florey, 505 N.E.2d 1096 (111. 1987), the
trial court was found to have erred when it to refuse to
admit evidence of the victim's reputation for violence, as
well as evidence of violent acts and threats of the victim
on a specific occasion, even though the conduct was directed
toward third persons.
Also, in State v. Daniels, 465 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1991),
the circuit court was found to have abused its discretion by
ruling in an attempted murder case that the defendant, while
17

acting in self defense with a dangerous weapon, could not
prove his fearful state of mind by evidence other than his
own knowledge of the victim's prior violent acts.
Similarly, the trial court in Mr. Thompson's case abused
its discretion by prohibiting evidence of the deceased's
reputation for violence with accounts of her widely known
violent history.

Whether the deceased ever behaved in an

aggressive or violent manner was too general of a question
to produce any meaningful testimony.

Further, state statute

specifically provides for evidence of past violent acts to
be considered by the trier of fact when a claim of self
defense is offered:

(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under
Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is
not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would
result in death or serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent
propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the
parties' relationship.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)

(1994)(emphasis added).

According to the above statute, admitting evidence of
the decedent's prior violent acts or violent propensities is

18

proper in a case such as this.

By ruling the specific

questions designed to produce relevant, probative evidence,
the trial court prohibited the defense from advancing its
case to the jury.

The defense is entitled to have its

theory of the case put to the jury if there "is any basis in
the evidence to support that theory."

State v.

Brown, 607

P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) .
Evidence to support that theory existed in the testimony
of Mr. Russom and Mr. Brimhall.

By ruling the evidence of

the decedent's violent past inadmissible, the trial court
committed reversible error as it prevented Mr. Thompson from
adequately defending himself by fully presenting his theory
of the case.
The jury was wrongly denied highly probative, relevant
evidence of the violent propensities of the decedent, and
the was not provided sufficient information to adequately
weigh the evidence in determining the reasonableness of Mr.
Thompson's response.

The prohibited testimony would have

allowed the defense to advance its theory of the case and to
provided the jury with the important evidence that by itself
could reasonably support an acquittal.

19

II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
A. The State Failed to Prove Every Element of
the Offense.
Because the jury has the exclusive function of

determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing
the evidence, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict.
892, 893 (Utah 1986) .

State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d

However, this standard cannot

conceal gaps in the evidence.

"A fundamental precept of our

criminal law is that the State must prove all elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Starks, 627 P.2d
88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah
1983).

The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah

Constitutions protect the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
supra.;

Starks,

In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) .
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support Mr.
Thompson's conviction because the state failed to prove the
requisite intent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203.
20

The

evidence produced at trial does not establish Thompson acted
intentionally or knowingly, but rather the evidence supports
the inference that he acted reflexively and without the
opportunity to form the requisite intent under the statute.
Intent is "an element that often can be proved only by
means of circumstantial proof."

Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504

(Utah 1986) . Indeed, recent decisions have shown certain
circumstances are sufficient to prove the defendant's
intent.

See, e.g. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah

1986) (evidence sufficient to show intent to retain and
receive stolen property); Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Utah
1896) (evidence sufficient to prove intent to kill in
attempted murder case); Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 557-58 (Utah
1985) (sufficient evidence to uphold conviction for
aggravated burglary); State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359 (Utah
1983) (evidence, including identifications by victim and
neighbor, sustain conviction of burglary and aggravated
assault).
Unlike in these cases, the state failed to show any
significant circumstance to support the finding of requisite
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution had to

prove that at the time of the shooting, Thompson had the
21

intent to cause the death of Ballard, or that he knowingly
caused her death.
The prosecution offered no meaningful theory consistent
to support such a finding.

Even when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict, the evidence falls far short
establishing intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instead of providing evidence of intent, the state
argued that Ballard had become a "pest in the house" (the
prosecution's words) (R. 1082), and because of this
prosecution theory supposedly Thompson had the motive to
kill his friend.

However, motive is not the equivalent of

intent.
The state also argued that because Ballard had been shot
six times, this evidenced Thompson's intent to kill her.
However, evidence supports the defense's contention that
Thompson was experienced with both his .22 rifle and the .44
magnum and was well aware of their relative power.
7 94).

(R.

Under the circumstances, it was reasonable to fire

multiple shots in order to defend himself against an
aggressor with a much more dangerous weapon.
Because it failed to produce any evidence to show that
Thompson had the capacity to form the requisite intent, the
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state could only point to Thompson's conduct after the
shooting. However, like motive, evidence of flight or
concealment of a crime cannot substitute for intent. While
it is often used by the prosecution to supply evidence of
guilt, evidence of flight or concealment of a crime should
not be equated with an admission of guilt.

State v. Bales,

675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) . Further, the Utah Supreme
Court has stated the inference of guilt may not be used to
establish the defendant's intent before the act was
committed. Id.
In State v.

Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the

Supreme Court specifically stated that evidence of an
accused's acts after the commission of a crime may not be
used by the prosection to establish the requisite mens rea
of a crime.

In Bolsinger, a woman had died during sexual

intercourse with the defendant, and the defendant confessed
to strangling her to heighten her orgasm.

After realizing

she had died, the defendant tried to disguise what had
occurred by covering the decedent's body with a sheet and
tearing up her apartment to make it appear as if a murderrape-burglary had taken place.

The court reversed the

conviction of murder in the second degree, and suggested the
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evidence of concealment so offended the jury that they
convicted the defendant without sufficient evidence to
establish intent:
The evidence here simply does not support a
finding of depravity in the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of [decedent]. The jury may well
have been swayed by the reprehensible conduct of the
defendant subsequent to her death. But that conduct is
not before us for review. The evidence is undisputed
that [decedent] was dead when defendant rose from the
bed. He himself covered her face with a sheet, a
universal gesture acknowledging death. At that moment
the conduct which subjected him to a charge of
criminal homicide came to an end.
Id. at 1221(emphasis added).
Similarly, in the instant case, the state failed to meet
its burden on the element of intent and instead relied on
evidence of motive and the horrific details of the
concealment of the crime as improper substitutes.
Because the prosecution failed to prove every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Thompson's
conviction must be overturned.
B.

Evidence Refuting Self Defense Was So Lacking
and Insubstantial That a Jury Could Not Have
Reached a Guilty Verdict Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt.

Besides proving every element of the offense, the state
must also have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the absence
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of self defense.

It is not the defendant's burden to

"establish a defense of self defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence."
v.

Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, at 214 (Utah 1985).

State

The jury may

acquit even though the evidence of self defense falls "far
short of establishing the justification or excuse by a
preponderance of the evidence upon the subject."

State v.

Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (1974).
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence, whether
the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the
defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude that a killing was done to protect the
defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the killing was not in self defense. Starks,
supra

at 92.

At trial, evidence was produced by Thompson's own
testimony, that he had acted in response to Ballard
threatening to shoot him with a .44 magnum.

(R. 42). The

prosecution's only attempt to refute the claim of self
defense was to state in closing arguments, the following:
I'd suggest to you the evidence also shows he was not
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justified in [shooting Ballard], because there was no
reason for him to be afraid. That any reasonable person
placed in his circumstances, would not have been afraid
of Trika Ballard. That any reasonable person under
those circumstances would have waited until she calmed
down, would have called the police, would have had her
leave with Chad when Chad came, would have done any of a
number of other things, other than shoot her. (R. 1085).
Such speculation offered by the prosecution does not
satisfy the state's burden to refute the claim of self
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the state failed

to meet its burden to show the killing was not in self
defense, the conviction must be overturned.

III.

THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL.
Not Harmless Error.

The combination of these errors

warrants overturning the jury's verdict.

No reasonable

jury, absent these errors, could find that Mr. Thompson
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Trika
Ballard, without the justification of self defense.
The doctrine of harmless error applies to "errors which,
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal,
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is
no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
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of the proceedings."

State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949,

957-58 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989)), afffd 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).

For

an error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah

1987).
In determining whether reversal is warranted, several
factors are considered, including "the importance of the
witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of
the prosecution's case."

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200,

205 (Utah 1987).
Here, the most important eye-witness testimony was that
of Mr. Thompson.

Thompson never denied he shot Ballard, but

rather offered a reasonable justification for his conduct.
This justification was never refuted by cross-examination,
material contradictions by other witnesses or physical
evidence.

The sum of the prosecution's case was that
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Thompson was not reasonable in his response to a lifethreatening situation.
In this case, the likelihood of a different outcome at a
fair trial is extremely high.

In a fair trial, the jury

would not be prejudiced against the defendant and would
receive evidence of the decedent's character, reputation and
the reasonableness of certain actions in self-defense.

In a

fair trial, the defendant's constitutional right to Due
Process guaranteed by the United States and Utah
Constitutions would be preserved by requiring the
prosecution to prove each and every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt and further requiring the
prosecution to refute the claim of self defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high in this case to warrant disturbing the
jury verdict and these errors should not be considered
harmless.
CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons Mr. Thompson
respectfully requests that relief be granted and that his
conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the district
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court for an order of dismissal or the scheduling of a new
trial.
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1

character trait.

2

THE COURT:

3

(Side bar conference.)

4

THE COURT:

5

would, for a moment.

6

with anyone else.

Let me get counsel to approach.

Sir, you may step out, if you
Please don't discuss your testimony

If I could look at the rule, Mr. Mack, and then

7
8

I'll let you make your argument fully on the record.

9

Thank you.
MR. MACK:

10

Your Honor, through the two

11

witnesses that we have had some discussion with, Bob

12

Russom and Kelly Brimhall, it's our desire to have them

13

testify with respect to their opinions that they have

14

regarding a character trait of the victim under Rule 404,

15

rule of evidence 404-A-2.

16

Specifically they have both- -

17

we got that far with Mr. Brimhall, but they each, at

18

least, indicated to the court that they were aware of at

19

least one instance of violence that they had observed,

20

threatening behavior or violence, on the part of Trika

21

Ballard.

22

admitted, subject to the rule.

23

I don't know if

And we would ask that that be allowed to be

We're offering it to show that she could have

24

been the aggressor in this case, and that Mr. Thompson,

25

and I think we, at some point, are going to need to show
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reasonable apprehension on his part for the use of deadly
force.

And I think that bolsters that, allows us to get#

to overcome that hurdle showing that she, indeed, was
capable, at least, of violent behavior.
THE COURT:

Do you want to speak to that,

Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Two things.

If this is offered

for the purpose of telling the jury this is a violent
person, then it's inappropriate.

Because two instances,

four years old, under circumstances that are entirely
divorced from the kind of circumstances we're talking
about—we're talking about circumstances that involve
family members—and under one circumstance, the witness
indicated something about her husband or boyfriend was the
individual with whom she was fighting.

I would suggest

that those circumstances are entirely different than the
kind of circumstances we're talking about here.
If we're talking about trigger mechanisms for
anger and violence, those trigger mechanisms are not
present in this case.

For that reason I would indicate

that it's not relevant, and it's not probative.
And the purpose it would be offered for would
be to color the jury's attitude of this individual, who is
not here to speak for herself.
THE COURT:

Well, let me say this.
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provides evidence of a person's character, or a trait of
character, is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except, and in subsection 2, it talks about evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of
the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case
to rebut evidence.
Well, this isn't evidence of peacefulness of
the victim.

This would be evidence of violence.

And you

would be offering, as I understand it, Mr. Mack, to prove
that she acted in conformity with that on a particular
occasion; is that correct?
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

That is correct.
All right.

Now, the only thing

that could be deemed being in conformity, is not general
argumentativeness, or general throwing of things.

Your

contention is that she was violent in the use of a weapon.
You can ask these witnesses that if they knew her to have
a reputation for violence in connection with use of a
weapon.

That, it seems to me, falls within 404.
General reputation for arguing, fighting,

throwing things, is not really what's relevant here.
That's not what you're attempting to establish, is it?
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MR. MACK:

Well, Your Honor, I guess we view,

we define violence differently.

I don't think it's

necessarily restricted to the fact whether or not she ever
used a weapon.
THE COURT:

No, it is not.

restricted in that way.

Violence is not

But if you are looking at

establishing action in conformity with your theory on a
particular occasion, you're not talking about simple
general aggressive tendencies.

You're talking about

aggressive tendencies with a weapon.
that.

I will not allow anything more generic.
MR. MACK:

Okay.

Well, I don't think I can ask

that question of these people.
there.

And I will allow

I don't think that's

Whether she was violent with a weapon.

I mean I

don't know the answer to that, but I don't think it's
there.

And I wouldn't ask them that question, if that's

all I can ask them with respect to her character, in the
context of what we're talking about.
THE COURT:

How is it appropriate for me to let

you bring in character evidence of her general
aggressiveness, which is really what you're seeking to
bring in- MR. MACK:

Your Honor, I think ultimately we

have to show reasonable fear on the part of Mr. Thompson,
that his life, or Lisa Edwards' life was in jeopardy
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because of all the circumstances that existed, because of
the behavior of Trika Ballard,

And I think that offering,

having people testify who knew her and who saw her behave
in an aggressive and violent way makes that claim.
bolsters that.

It

It shows that yeah, she is capable of

being the aggressor.
THE COURT:

I'm going to let you ask the

question, "Have you ever seen her behave in an aggressive
or violent manner?" And I am going to let Mr. Blaylock
follow up in any way he deems appropriate, including
asking the question, "Have you ever known her to be
violent and use a weapon?" And he can also get into what
the basis of their opinion is.
I'm doing this because I know how the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court operate.

I think if I were

reading the rules strictly, I would not allow it.

I'm

going to allow it. And it's limited in that way, and you
can tell the one witness, tell both of them that they are
to listen carefully to the questions.
I don't want to get into this business about
the child and her children being taken from her.
not relevant.

That is

It's highly prejudicial, and I further do

not want to get into acts of domestic violence with any
specificity.

You can ask if those acts of domestic

violence involved her spouse or her live-in boyfriend, and
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if they involved any weapons.
Also, I'm not allowing them to talk about
hearsay.
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

Okay.
You need to establish what the

basis of their knowledge is, and if it isn't first-hand
knowledge, it's not coming in.
MR. MACK:
THE COURT:

Okay.
All right, let's proceed.

the jury back in, please.

Bring

Let's put the last witness on

again.
MR. MACK:

Could we hear the question?

I'm not

sure if I asked him in front of the jury the magic
question, here.
THE COURT:

As soon as we get the jury in we'll

have Cecilee read that back.
(The jury entered the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, did anyone

hear anything or discuss the case while we were in recess
just now?

No hands are raised.
Mr. Thompson, you're still under oath, and if

you would retake the stand.

Before anything is asked any

further, I'm going to have the court reporter read back
the last question.
(WHEREUPON the pending question was read by the
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